In searching for a coherent program, however, scholars chased a shadow. Believing that the working class had to achieve a social revolution on its own, revolutionary syndicalists emphasized their workingclass roots and disdained intellectual involvements, even rejecting association with radical intellectuals openly sympathetic with revolutionary syndicalism.12 Instead of forming an organized movement with a unified and coherent program, syndicalists distinguished themselves from other labor activists by holding more general beliefs: notably, the need for a social revolution to be achieved by the workers themselves through a general strike. Their commitment to independent 10 working-class revolutionary action set syndicalists apart from both business unionists and orthodox socialists because it implied some specific positions. In supporting a union movement independent of electoral socialism, for example, revolutionary syndicalists were allied with business unionists against Marxist socialists. The alliance did not extend, however, to syndicalist campaigns against militarism, patriotism, and capitalism. Those views united syndicalists and political socialists. But unlike the Marxist socialists, who disdained the gains to be won through economic action, syndicalists and business unionists believed strikes were the central tool of working-class collective action. Superficially, revolutionary syndicalist strikes were indistinguishable from those of business unions; they differed only in their ultimate goals. Business unionists struck to raise wages and improve working conditions. For syndicalists, however, strikes, including strikes for higher wages and better working conditions, were valuable because they taught the benefits of solidarity and collective action. Syndicalist unions were more than vehicles for improving life under capitalism; they were schools of a new, proletarian political economy, organizing centers for the social revolution.
To be sure, few revolutionary syndicalists were optimistic enough to expect that a revolutionary general strike was imminent. As a goal, however, the image of a revolutionary general strike focused their minds and led them to direct their energies to advance the revolution by promoting working-class solidarity through union action involving all workers. To Commons, Perlman, and Stearns, this is a futile task; they assume that immutable craft egoism and a jealous hostility to workers of other crafts, industries, and regions will forever prevent the development of class-wide solidarity. Such attitudes did not discourage revolutionary syndicalists because they thought dialectically. For them, attitudes are variable, products of experience and subject to change by socializing experience. Participation in solidaristic unions and collective actions, then, will teach new values. 13 Without an imminent revolution, revolutionary syndicalism was a union program more than a revolutionary tactic. In practice, revolutionary syndicalists were "practical revolutionaries" interested in forming strong unions.'4 For revolutionary syndicalists, unions and Bourses du travail (buildings granted by municipal governments to serve as headquarters for unions in a locality) were "schools of social economy,"' and strikes were training grounds for socialism, "revolutionary gymnastics" teaching solidarity.'5 Beyond the details of doctrine, revolutionary syndicalists agreed on the importance of involving workers in unions and strikes across craft and industry lines and without regard to skill, gender, or national origin.'6 Through participation in working-class institutions and actions, workers would learn to be revolutionaries.
Dreams of a social revolution did not distract revolutionary syndicalists from attempts to improve the conditions of daily life within capitalism.'7 On the contrary, they emphasized daily struggles because they believed that achieving reforms would advance the revolution both by empowering workers and by giving them confidence in the power of united, working-class action.'8 If inclusive, solidaristic unions were clearly ineffectual in strikes, then revolutionary syndicalists would have faced a difficult dilemma. They were spared the choice between doctrine and successful practice because both theory and experience taught them that strikes are won by increasing the number of workers participating rather than by increasing the union's organization and financial resources. "Before growing capitalist concentration," Leon Jouhaux, longtime head of the CGT, declared to the 1909 unity congress of the metal trades federation, "[our] conclusion must be to realize the concentration of the workers' forces." 19 Success in labor dis- 16 As explained below, such appeals to class solidarity may have been most important for the unskilled and semiskilled workers in larger establishments, workers who often lacked the group cohesion that comes from common sociability and training in common skills.
17 Short of a revolutionary situation where the working class as whole is prepared to rise up and seize power, such as existed in Russia in 1905 and 1917, the strike demands made by revolutionary syndicalists resemble those made by business unionists. Both demand higher wages, better working conditions, and more control over the workplace because there is nothing else their unions can ask from individual employers. Revolutionary syndicalists may even be more prone than business unionists to make simple wage and hour, rather than work-rule, demands because wage and hour concessions can more easily be extended to all workers, skilled and unskilled, without promoting divisions among them. There is some evidence for this; work-rule demands were made in about 20 percent of French strikes, 1895-99 and 1910-14, compared with over 30 percent of American strikes, 1881-1905. In addition, the proportion of union strikes raising wage-andhour issues is about 10 percent higher in French strikes in industries and departments where the dominant union was led by revolutionary syndicalists than in other industries and departments. putes, revolutionary syndicalists insisted, depended not on the unions' cashbox but on "the vigor displayed in the battle and the penetration of the revolutionary ideal among the workers." 20
In practice, syndicalist unions were designed to mobilize large numbers of workers rather than enhance the bargaining leverage of small groups of craftsmen. Revolutionary syndicalists were organized for guerilla war and traveled light, with few benefit funds or paid officials. Most French unions had dues a fraction of those found in the United Kingdom, Germany, or the United States. Outside of printing, where the dominant union opposed revolutionary syndicalism, the average French worker paid barely half a franc a month in union dues, well under 0.5 percent of wages. This was a quarter of the 2-percent rate common elsewhere. Some lamented the lack of insurance benefits or paid union organizers, but others openly chose "to have 4,000 members at 0.50 [francs] rather than 2,500 at 0.75." 21 Some even applauded small union treasuries, fearing that more resources would allow some future conservative union leader to restrain rank-and-file militancy. Instead, the lack of large centrally controlled benefit funds on the Anglo-Saxon (British and American) or German model prevented French unions from putting any significant restraints on rankand-file movements (see Figure 1) . 22 Revolutionary syndicalists also urged French unions to substitute industrial and regional unions emphasizing broad working-class solidarity for craft organization. The CGT promoted the amalgamation of craft affiliates into industrial and regional unions, leading to the orga- 29 Rist, "La Situation financiere des syndicats," 39. 30 Rist used the official reports of the Office du travail, the same data I use below. Data on union membership were collected as part of an annual filing by unions required by the WaldeckRousseau law of 1884 legalizing trade organizations. Because membership was reported by the unions themselves, the data may be inflated by union leaders hoping to enhance their union's influence and importance. There is no evidence of this, however. If membership numbers were arbitrary, then one would expect that they would not be subject to change from year to year and that they would cluster at large and round numbers. Instead, the great majority of unions report a low membership with little heaping on round numbers, and reported membership fluctuated, sometimes dramatically, from year to year. Since only wage workers join unions, the true measure of a union's recruitment success is the share of wage workers in the membership, not the union share of the total labor force. According to that criterion, French unions did as well as American unions overall, and within manufacturing they attracted a larger share of wage earners than did unions in either the United States or the United Kingdom (see Table 1 ). The overall unionization rate is higher in the United Kingdom than 33 In regressions for union membership as a share of the nonagricultural labor force, the coefficient on per capita income is statistically significant. A dummy variable for France is negative, but not significantly different from zero. There is direct evidence that revolutionary syndicalist ideology contributed to the success French unions enjoyed in attracting members in large, modern establishments. French industries can be divided into three groups according to the political disposition of the industry's leading unions around 1906.39 They include industries whose leading unions supported the CGT's revolutionary syndicalist leadership and program, those whose unions are "moderate" in comparison with revolutionary syndicalism, and industries classed as "other" where the leading unions were of mixed ideology. The "moderate" group includes some locales and industries with strong union movements regardless of ideology, including printers and miners and workers from highly urbanized departments in the North. As a result, the moderates enrolled a significantly higher share of the workforce than did revolution- 36 Variations in union membership rates in one country explain about a third of the variation in membership rates in the other; the R-Squared statistic of a regression of the unionization rates in the United Kingdom and the United States in Table 1 ary syndicalist unions or unions in the "other" group (see Figure 4) . But the moderates' advantage was entirely due to their strength in small, artisanal establishments and in industries where unions were relatively strong regardless of ideology. By contrast, revolutionary syndicalist unions were more effective in attracting workers new to the union movement, including the semiskilled workers employed in modern, large establishments. In establishments with fewer than ten workers, for example, the share of workers is over twice as high in industries and departments where the unions are led by moderates, as it is where revolutionary syndicalists are dominant. But the moderate advantage falls to zero in establishments with more than twenty-five workers.
Regression analysis, controlling for location and industry, confirms that the moderates' recruitment advantage holds only for smaller establishments. Moderate union ideology is associated with a 3.4-percentage point higher unionization rate (about 25 percent) in establishments employing one worker, but only a 1.4-percentage point edge (or 8 percent) in establishments employing ten workers. By contrast, among workers in establishments employing twenty-five workers, revolutionary syndicalist unions had a unionization rate 1.5 percentage 1-UPR) ), where UPR is the unionization rate calculated as (2)UPR = MEMB/WE, where MEMB is the number of union members in the industry within the department and WE is the number of wage earners. Where there are no union members, I have added 0.01 members. In a few cases there are as many or more reported members than wage earners; in these cases I have assumed there was actually one fewer member than wage earners. The weight used is (3)UPR*(1-UPR)*(WE**.5), where (WE**.5) is the square-root of the number of wage earners. Note: This figure gives the predicted unionization rate for different establishment sizes predicted from regressions for industry unionization rates within manufacturing industries in forty-seven American cities in 1899 and continental French departments for 1898, 1905, and 1910. Independent variables include the logarithm of the average establishment size in the industry and department, the local socialist vote share, the logarithm of the size of the department's largest city, the proportion of the department's population living in urban areas, the proportion of males in the industry's labor force in the department or city, the proportion of immigrants in the department or city, the proportion of the French department's labor force employed in industry, the French department's illiteracy rate among its army recruits, and industry and regional dummy variables. The French regressions also include dummy variables for whether the dominant union in the industry in the department was associated with the moderate or the revolutionary syndicalist wing of the CGT and the interaction of those dummy variables and the logarithm of the average establishment size in the industry and department. points (or 10 percent) higher than the rate for moderate unions, and the estimated unionization rate in very large establishments, those employing 250 workers, rises to 18.7 percent for revolutionary syndicalists compared with 13.5 percent for moderate unions, an absolute difference of over 5 percentage points or nearly 40 percent (see Figure 5) . 40 Much of the difference between patterns of unionization in France and the United States is caused by differences between revolutionary syndicalist recruitment in France and recruitment by business unions in the United States. In the United States and outside the revolutionary syndicalist sector in France, union membership falls with increases in establishment size (see Figure 5) . The increase in unionization with establishment size within France, arguably the most striking difference between patterns of unionization in the two countries, is due entirely to the strength of this pattern among revolutionary syndicalist-led unions (see Figure 5 ).
Did Revolutionary Syndicalist Strikes Fail?
Strikes were central to revolutionary syndicalism. There, workers were to learn the value of solidarity, not by passively belonging to a union but through participation in collective action. These were "revolutionary gymnastics," teaching workers to "overcome habits of submission and passivity. "41 But, of course, workers would learn their lessons in the power of working-class solidarity best from successful strikes.
By 1900, French workers had accepted revolutionary syndicalist 40 The following discussion reports the predicted values from weighted regressions where the dependent variable is the log-odds of the unionization rate in an industry within a department for each of the years 1898, 1905, and 1910. The log-odds (LOD) is calculated as (1) LOD = LOG(UPR/(1-UPR)), where LOG is the natural logarithm and UPR is the unionization rate calculated as (2) UPR = MEMB/WE, where MEMB is the number of union members in the industry within the department and WE is the number of wage earners. Where there are no union members, I have added 0.01 members because the logarithm of zero is undefined. In a few cases, the number of reported members is as great as or greater than the number of wage earners; in these cases, I have assumed that there was actually one fewer member than wage earners.
The weight used is the following: (3) UPR*(1-UPR)*(WE**.5), where (WE**.5) is the square-root of the number of wage earners. Independent variables include the logarithm of the average establishment size in the industry and department, the local socialist vote share, the logarithm of the size of the department's largest city, the proportion of the department's population living in urban areas, the proportion of males in the industry's labor force in the department, the proportion of immigrants in the department, the proportion of the department's labor force employed in industry, the department's illiteracy rate among its army recruits, and industry and regional dummy variables. The regressions also include dummy variables for whether the dominant union in the industry in the department was associated with the moderate or with the revolutionary syndicalist wing of the CGT and the interaction of those dummy variables and the logarithm of the average establishment size in the industry and department. The regressions are available upon request from the author. 41 42 The American striker rate remained at about twenty strikers for every thousand wage earners from 1880 through 1905. French strikes were shorter than American strikes, and they declined in duration by about a day (or by 15 percent) from the 1880s to after 1900. As a result, the relative volume of strike activity-(strikers*duration)/wage earners -remained somewhat less in France than in the United States after 1900, despite rising much more rapidly in France. 43 This was implicitly recognized in French law, which legalized strikes in 1864, twenty years before unions were legalized. 44 The France, Victor Griffuelhes argued that "despite defeats ... the French working class knows how to struggle."46 Emile Pouget agreed. He attributed rising strike success rates after 1900 to the growth of the CGT, "the spread of the revolutionary ideal among the French workers, and not to the power of their union reserves." 47 Griffuelhes concluded that statistics of strike success were proof that "the concern for immediate gains is not obscured by the affirmation renewed daily for the revolutionary ideal."48
Revolutionary syndicalist unions developed a winning strategy that allowed them to conduct effective strikes without large benefit funds because they were able to attract government support. All unions choose between a "narrow" strategy of providing small groups of workers with financial aid accumulated through high dues and an "inclusive" one of involving additional workers to maximize the general impact of a strike to attract public support. A commitment to workingclass solidarity led revolutionary syndicalists to choose the "inclusive" strategy, and their unions attracted members because in France during the early Third Republic this was an effective strategy.
The -27June 1909, 2-3 . 49 The American data include only strikes because data on lockouts were collected separately and are reported in an incompatible format. About 5 percent of American labor disputes are classified as lockouts and after the mid-1890s workers fared much more poorly in these disputes than in strikes. Including lockouts reduces the American success rate from 56 percent to 54 percent, nearly the same as the French success rate. Excluding lockouts probably inflates the favorable impact of American unions on strike success because unions were less effective in lockouts than in strikes. An expansive strike strategy succeeded because French officials were prepared to intervene in strikes to support labor to limit the threat large strikes posed to the social order. Republican officials intervened in a fifth of French strikes before 1914. As in the United States, intervention was most common in large strikes that attracted considerable public notice and posed the greatest threat to public order. Unlike their American counterparts, however, French strikers benefitted from this notice because state officials used their leverage to settle strikes by forcing concessions from recalcitrant employers. State intervention is associated with a dramatic increase in French strike success rates. Strikers gain at least some concessions in over 73 percent of strikes with state intervention compared to only 48 percent of strikes without intervention.
Revolutionary syndicalists did better than other French trade unionists because their commitment to mobilizing large numbers of workers in collective action increased the probability of state intervention. The rate of state intervention was over twice as high (26 percent) in revolutionary syndicalist strikes as in strikes in industries and departments whose unions were led by moderates (11 percent). Revolutionary syndicalists won this state support by increasing the number of strikers by 25 percent and by increasing the proportion of workers in struck establishments joining the strike from 42 percent all the way up to 71 percent.
The Third Republic and Revolutionary Syndicalism
The paradox of revolutionary syndicalism is that its success depended on state support, on an implicit alliance between them and a liberal state they despised. Revolutionary syndicalists believed that direct worker action was a substitute for political action, but when confronting powerful employers they depended on the state to gain concessions they could not win on their own. This led to a further irony: the syndicalists' reliance on mass strikes undermined the basis for their success because in the long run such strikes antagonized state officials and drove frightened employers to mobilize collectively in self-defense. By expanding the range of labor militancy, syndicalists convinced labor's liberal allies that their strategy of conciliation could not incorporate organized labor into the established republican capitalist order. But without state support, against an increasingly hostile state, revolutionary syndicalist unions could not flourish.
French officials did not intend to aid revolutionary syndicalism but neither did they use strike intervention to reward unions for ideo- It was growing strike activity and the revolutionary syndicalist threat that led many French employers to band together in defense of property and their interests as employers. Membership in French employer associations grew sharply, increasing after 1895 even faster than union membership. Employer organizations were involved in barely 25 percent of strikes in 1895-99, but after a decade of revolutionary syndicalist agitation, they were involved in nearly half of strikes in 1910-14. To be sure, most employer associations were poorly prepared to support long strikes or lockouts. But they were more effective as political organizations able to restrain state interference in labor relations. By itself, the presence of an employer association has little direct effect on the probability that strikers will gain any of their demands. But the indirect effect is much greater because employer associations reduce dramatically the probability that state officials will intervene in strikes.61
Late-nineteenth-century French employer associations were a response to labor militancy. They were most common in strikes in localities where there had been a large volume of past strike activity. Every doubling in past strike activity in a department is associated with an increase of 15 percent in the probability that struck employers would belong to an association.62 The mass strike that revolutionary syndicalists used to teach workers the benefits of solidarity taught the same lesson to labor's opponents.
The Dialectics of Revolutionary Syndicalism
Revolutionary syndicalism never produced a revolution. Instead, it died a slow death in a pre-World War I crise syndicaliste.63 The heady years of rapid membership growth and growing strike activity ended Revolutionary syndicalism failed because in their concern to mobilize workers its practitioners neglected the impact they had on state officials and employers. Concerned only with mobilizing labor, syndicalists forgot that labor is the weaker party in the class conflict and needs to nurture cross-class alliances against hostile and powerful employers. In this mistaken focus on workers the syndicalists have been followed by labor historians who approach revolutionary syndicalism's failure only from the workers' perspective, concluding from the crise syndicaliste that French workers had abandoned syndicalist aspirations to revolutionary action. But the crise was not caused by a withdrawal of working-class support; rather, it reflected the growing political isolation of France's extreme left, isolation due to the hostile reaction to syndicalism by state officials and by newly mobilized employers. French workers supported revolutionary syndicalist unions and strikes as much after 1906 as before. What changed was that the French state and French employers had exhausted their tolerance for revolutionary unionism.
